x, leader of a country, X, receives a deeply unpleasant threat from y, leader of another country, Y. x decides to comply with the ‘request’ made in the threat because to do otherwise would have led to considerable harm to X from organisations under the control of Y. x carefully recorded the threat made by y. He distributes a sealed message – containing a recording of the threat, together with strong evidence linking it to y – to various trustworthy individuals. They are instructed to make public the contents of the message in the event of his murder (or kidnap or further intimidation brought to their attention) or an attempt of the same. x then publicly announces that a threat was made which, if carried through would have caused considerable harm to X. x further announces that a monthly auction will be held to determine whether the details of the threat will be released to the public. Those wanting disclosure* can put money into (sole purpose) bank account A and those wanting the opposite can put money into bank account B. A private communication to y confirms that the auction relates to the threat made to x. x also informs y of the sealed messages that he has sent as ‘insurance’. Proceeds of the auction go to the bait-ul-maal.
This process seeks to put a value on the disclosure, or otherwise, of the threat. Is it unacceptable on the basis that it amounts to blackmailing y?** Even if this is the case, might it not prevent future threats? Or will it simply shift the threats to a format less easy to record and trace? For untraceable, but credible threats, perhaps the best approach is for x to promptly record them on his blog (or other public interface) so that by making the threat public knowledge market participants are given an opportunity to react (e.g. insurance premiums in zone A may increase if it is mentioned in the context of a credible untraceable threat). Such disclosure would be a small but not insignificant step towards making public knowledge less imperfect than it would otherwise be.
*Is there excessive gharar in relation to those who want disclosure without knowing what will be disclosed?
This process seeks to put a value on the disclosure, or otherwise, of the threat. Is it unacceptable on the basis that it amounts to blackmailing y?** Even if this is the case, might it not prevent future threats? Or will it simply shift the threats to a format less easy to record and trace? For untraceable, but credible threats, perhaps the best approach is for x to promptly record them on his blog (or other public interface) so that by making the threat public knowledge market participants are given an opportunity to react (e.g. insurance premiums in zone A may increase if it is mentioned in the context of a credible untraceable threat). Such disclosure would be a small but not insignificant step towards making public knowledge less imperfect than it would otherwise be.
*Is there excessive gharar in relation to those who want disclosure without knowing what will be disclosed?
**Perhaps the process amounts to a ‘lesser evil’ than the threat made by y and is therefore acceptable?
 

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